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  • Time Period > Presidential (Nov. 22, 1963-Jan. 20, 1969) (remove)
  • Series > Memos to the President (remove)

129 results

  • Eisenhower and Kennedy, as well as under President Johnson, to take a stand against aggression in Vietnam. We have do:c..e this because the aggression there was a threat to the liberties of all ~-~a:;::k~.n6., including our own. Southeast Asia has become
  • the Secretary of State, the U. S. Ambassador to the Congo (Robert McBride), the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelllgenc·e . · z. Ambassador 'McBride recommended the C-130•s after the m.ost sober
  • under the direction of President Kennedy and yourself, first in the formulation of the Alliance for Progress, then as United States Ambassador to Brazil, and now in my present post. During these years, cooperation among the governments and peoples
  • '-40. C ANCELLED PEA E.O. t >t,. l ;,t'~ StC. i .3 AND itRCHiVIST'S MEMO Or r-d>\A. 16. 1S83. . February 21, 1967 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Calls to CIA Since Inauguration (Compiled from CIA and .Mrs. Roberts
  • 'f 1' ~) v~ Omar George Kisti.akowsky Black - -- Brac'!.ley_~-- John Cowles Arthur Dean ----- Arthur Larson Morris Leibman Robert Lovett - 7 Roswell Gilpatric Paul G. Hoffman --- John J. Mc Cloy I -------- Teodoro Moscoso l•Me:e Pcdcins
  • reference to wa.ntlng to talk to Axnbaseado:r J,o nes before replylng to-you refers to hls deslre to review the memorandum o.f' unde:r­ standlng whlch Walt pl'"epar.ed. Points 4, 6 and 7 are deslgned to provide a.dditlonal reassurance. Robert Komer
  • '. in .. the motion pictures • • • " 1 Robert/q
  • House and himself on important matters affecting Soviet-American relations. He said that during President Kennedy's administration such informal chapnel existed in the presence of the then Attorney General. He quickly added that because of Senator
  • in the American dra:rt--the possibility must not be excluded of establishing in the future a joint integrated nuclear force at00ng those partners ot the NATO alliance who are prepared to do so. Finally, I talked with Mr. Rusk about the Kennedy Round
  • ¥:f'., NARA, Date f-/3'::~p CONFif>~NTIAL -2- You may know that the United Nations ' Palestine Con­ ciliation Commission (PCC), of which we are a member, made a genuine effort to solve the problem in 1961 after President Kennedy had opened the way
  • for about two and a half hours against the war." And when Robert Smith, Monrqe's predecessor as Secretary of State, issued a public address against the war, Chief Justice Marshall wrote him a letter of warm approval. Morrison and Commager sum up: "The truth
  • Chancellor Willy Brandt. We discussed Kennedy Round, international liquidity, the non-proliferation treaty once more, East-West relations and offset. This meeting lasted far beyond the scheduled time. It was in the same spirit as the morning meeting
  • - - not even Walt. Francis M. Bator NODIS - EXTREMELY SENSITIVE HARV ARD UNIVERSIT ... JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE OF POLITICS LITTAUER CENTER CAMBRIDGE 02138 June 27, 1967. EYES ONLY Dear Francis, In strictest confidence I
  • - . By d,- , NARA Datei,.1,_, 4 - ,, -2- You may know that the United Nations• Palestine Con­ ciliation Com.'nission (PCC), of which we are a member, made a genuine effort to solve the problem in 1961 after· President Kennedy had opened the way
  • of tough negotlatlng in Geneva followed. talks went lorward. the Nortb Vietnamese mlU.tary sltuatlon. with a large oHens1ve. Yet,even as the tried to change drastically the They gave up the effort only when President. Kennedy sent U. S. forces blto
  • called him to the. microphone also. · Mr. Whitlam, who has paid a crowded and bene­ fl .::ial series .. of calls in Washington, declined to talk about them at a press conference. · Yesterday he saw Sena­ tors Robert Kennedy, Ful­ bright and Mansfield
  • this small program {at most 250,000 tons or $15 million) is not worth the risk of being charged with bad faith under the Kennedy rou.i."1.d food aid and grain agreement. As you recall, all exporters agreed ·'- . . e re n o t o preempt specified shares
  • in President Kennedy's Administration was the fact that he, Kemal, had been allowed to have an entirely private 10-minute audience with President Kennedy. Kemal also said that he has Nasser's authority to have a similar private interview now if you invite him
  • in individual cases, he really has no shortage of access to responsible officials. This is an old battle with Joe. He had one round with President Kennedy and of course had an unending contest with President Eisenhower. He plans to raise this question again
  • would like nothing better, and we are prepared to react inunediately ~ to such an eventuality o· Approve _____________________ Disapprove_____________________ Discussion: I I j. .. The late President Kennedy and I on various occasions following
  • : .. ·":.->·>":~:.:.~, . . . '4 . '.:4. · [' ' ' • _, ' ,. • 1- ~. • ' I • ' • ' ' . ) : " ;· . i:1N INDIA ·?RESIDENT ·. KENNEDY WAS LOOKED .UPON ·· ~ s.PECIAL :·FRI.END . ;..·,· . ~1 ·· · .. WHO WAS . AUTHOR OF ' INDIAN ~ RESOLUTIOt-f I'N CONGRESS~ · WHO HAD
  • 10-~o. ,1 l\4arch 31, 1967 HIGHLIGHTS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE Conversation with Willy Brandt (March 29) Kennedy Round and Food Aid The Vice President: 1£ Kennedy Round fails it will set in motion forces detnanding troop cutbacks
  • Ball and Dean Rusk -- all Kennedy men -- and that the fact of the matter was that Tom Mann 'had been in favor of a slightly slower and cooler expression of support. I also told Pierre that there had not been a question of recognition, a point which he
  • • peralatence was a good example of the way tile pre•• in general baa strained to find a meanf.Dg that la not there. Ou Friday, I abo eaw Steve Roberta of the New York Time•. who i• preparing a retroapectlve article on President Kennedy for the Novem~r lssue
  • . The Secretary of Commerce ' has the immediate statutory responsibility, but the instinct of Luther Hodg es was often different from that of oth.e rs, and it became ne c ess a ry to appeal individual cases over and over again to President Kennedy. The President
  • about the reasons for our being in Viet-Nam and our objectives. The Administration's usual answer is that there is no reason for confusion. This is no answer. He cites the Bobby Kennedy statement regarding negotiating with the Viet Cong