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  • ://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Morris -- I -- 9 say the minimum time ever was probably an hour's advance notice. There's little doubt in my mind that when you had to do that, you almost inevitably had to go through the telephone system to get the clearance
  • ://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh -6- Leader, why, he and I would talk over the telephone or see each other two
  • Arms Control Disarmament Agency--had frequent occasions to deal with Mr. Spurgeon Keeney. M: Do any of these sort of stand out in your mind? Were you there, or were these primarily through telephone conversations? D: Mostly, I think it was Mr
  • or messages, that came to him every day in order, whether a telephone call or telegram, whether direct to him or through the Secretary of State, the decision that he made and brought me right up to the moment. He said--and it took him thirty minutes
  • that we had got our directionfinding equipment going so well up around Khe Sanh that whenever they'd hit the key for a minute, boom, they'd get hit. We'd get gripes; here were commanders on their telephones, saying, "Send me more--I need a radio operator
  • knew, General LeMay telephoned me and told me to come on over, that I was going to succeed Bozo McKee as vice chief. McS: General, did you discuss at all General LeMay's retirement and some of the friction that was occurring between him
  • determined not to make similar concessions in Vietnam. Nothing that was going on at that time led us to believe that in fact a similar policy was envisaged for Vietnam. But again, I don't recall that as being a very major topic of conversation. G: I had
  • I joined the Armored Division because that was the thing to do for horse cavalrymen in those days. telephone call. time. I was on maneuvers in Louisiana and got a General Gay [?] had called, Colonel Gay at that He was with General Patton. He
  • , we were in a recess and Mr. Rayburn was the only one there from the House and Mr. Truman was over there from the Senate--he was Vice President--and the telephone rang and Mr. Rayburn was sitting at the desk like this, answered it, says, "It's for you
  • a shorter-term view, clearly we did too many new things and not enough in each one. Conversely, and what you've got to remember is you have a situation now in which the federal government has the legislative authority and the precedent to do almost
  • . on the Joint Chiefs. II I was down We were having an exercise of some sort and the telephone rang, and it was the White House asking me to come over. got somebody to replace me and went over there. about 5:30 then. So I It was late in the afternoon And I
  • would use the gunships and the special forces company if we had to go in to get the people out. Well, what happened--first of all, the night before, I had gotten a promise from Lam that he would not move on--give me one more day. He got a telephone call
  • him. Bell Telephone and a bunch of the people opposed it. They came down. I've forgotten who was head of the Bell Telephone at that time. But he showed them, he said, "Boys, you can make money withholding on this dividend. You'll have that cash at your
  • with the Achesons. And I remember at break£ast-- the first morning that we were there--Dean Acheson had a telephone call in the middle of breakfast and went out and then came back to the table. he said to me, "That was Senator Lyndon Johnson." And And he s a i d
  • he meant. He could see that I was a little puzzled. He said, "I'm going to make you a full Special Assistant to me." My part in that conversation LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson
  • : You said that your first conversation with Johnson took place in October of 1964. R: Just before the 1964 elections. M: Then what was the subsequent nature of your relationship with him after that time? R: I didn't see him again until in the ADA
  • and information over the telephone by, "You know where we were yesterday," and this sort of thing, by doubletalk, as we'd call it. It just doesn't fool anybody. We proved it to them time and time again by intercepting them with our own intercept devices
  • as a standard before. And I think the biggest thing was getting people to put it into effect on their own and believing that in some way or another they were connected with the effort. For example, the telephone call which interrupted us a few minutes ago
  • or five members that were listening to the conversation. I called her and said, "You've got to repudiate this. It's a humiliation. You have to admit that this fellow's gone haywire but keep the blame on his defection; his default is a better word." His
  • strongly and if someone disagreed, he'd argue with them . B : Yes . G: I was going to ask you some more about those conversations that you and President Johnson and Senator Wirtz used to have when Lyndon Johnson was a young congressman . B: When he
  • but I could probably recall if I heard it--it's a one syllable name, I think, like Dean or Bell. This fellow seemed quite interested and told Senator Kennedy that he was going to report the conversation to Washington. And I think Senator Kennedy told
  • ? What did you do Does the State Department try to teach you a little bit of conversational Swedish, or do they just let you go on the way you are? And what do they do in the way of briefing? H: Well, I did not undertake to--as far as the language
  • did. F: Why didn't he go on the plane? C: Because by that time he knew he wasn't going to be. By that time he knew about the Bobby Kennedy conversation. F: Which Bobby Kennedy conversation? C: The Bobby Kennedy conversation, I've told you
  • : Sure. M: Was there any effort to get out the people? K: I dare say there was, but I didn't do it. M: Were you anticipating such a crowd? K: No. M: Did you have any conversations with him during this time? K: Oh, sure. M: Would you tell me
  • and had discussed various matters with him--and I had a very high opinion of him, if I may say so. He was an admirable man to talk with because it was a two-sided conversation with him. We were, in spite of our differences of age, sympathetic to each
  • it. what was on the other end of the conversation. I couldn't tell But the next thing I heard was, "Sam, I hope you'll help to try to head this thing off, because it's a bad thing." And then more conversation. Then I heard him say, "You know Sam, we
  • ://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] of that conversation. More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh L. Marks--II--12 My recollection is very hazy, because I
  • - nent or semi-permanent in Saigon was twelve or fifteen. Now, with a group that small, there was not so much peer pressure as there was simply a gathering of versation~ reporters~ shared experiences. lunch conversation, beer con- I don't think
  • apply any pressure myself in the same way that he could. on them. It's not even entirely fair to describe it as putting pressure It takes more than one conversation and one go-around to make a case on what's obviously a complicated and difficult
  • : http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh This is the second interview with Senator McGee in his office on March 10, 1969. Senator, without any preliminaries, did not you have some conversation with Mr. Johnson before you went on the Senate Foreign
  • , but it was early in their careers in the House. He spoke of and was impressed by this tall, lanky, energetic man from Texas. I remember that in his words. M: You1ve indicated to me in our conversation off the tape that you and your husband made a point
  • no notion to whom he had been introduced. So I would say it was at that level, the way people know public figures in Washington. S: By repute and by various brief contacts. H: And by very brief contacts and small, small conversations. I'm sure he
  • backing among the Mc: ~ress and a good many influential and well-to-do people. In =.:-:y occasion of his being up for election, did you have any conversations with him regarding getting more support for his candidacy? F: The only time that could have
  • ://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh 17 And the third is that he is extraordinarily sensitive and adept at diplomatic conversations. M: You mean interpersonal with foreign dignitaries? R: Dignitaries. It's often said, that oh, well, that's not his specialty
  • minutes of conversation with him and had my picture taken with him. Frankly, I was rather disappointed that I didn't get to speak with him longer, but, of course, I understood that he was very busy and very burdened, and I remember that I felt very
  • , but his intense .involvement came only after December . So he would have been operating concurrently with Ball? Concurrently--but the one that I described was very particularly George Ball's operation . Conversely, though, when the big pause came up
  • of conversation that you think might be important to record-either where you've touched the career of President Johnson, or anything in connection with your service in Vietnam during his Administration-that we haven't talked about? W: Outside of the times that I
  • of Kennedy's conversion to the Heller � � LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh 14