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Peace negotiations
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Presidential (Nov. 22, 1963-Jan. 20, 1969)
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The President: The only way to line it up is to proceed.
LThe President read Eugene Rostow 1 s note of October 29:
"Walt:
I had a further talk with my informant about the luncheon conversation
he attended yesterday.
The man who spoke was a member of the banking
- with limited
service for civil use; international faciUties are adequate; effective coverage
is provi~d by radio, wired and television broadcasts; 244,000 telephones
DEFENSE FORCES: (Secret - No Foreign Dissem)
Personnel: army 2,325,000, navy 142,300 (including
- in Laos.
7. We should stay away from talks about Cambodia.
8. We must push them to admit the facts about civilian losses in Hue.
9. It is essential to probe for private conversations.
TOP SECRET
;.
- 2
The President: Will they do anything until
- -~
Attending:
The President
Secretary Clifford
Undersecretary Katzenbach
CIA Director Helms
General Wheeler
George Christian
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson
President: Are you concerned about Jord.en's conversation?
Under secretary Katzenbach: I am encouraged
- to the 19th.. They may have
to ask for total cessation or no more conversations. There is a question
of face involved.
4. Curious oriental approach -- this action could give them reason to break
off negotiations. It is small chance, but I do not like
- .
Assistant Secretary Bundy:
We must do some hard thinking about
what we say in private conversation.
Walt Rostow: We must probe the proposal that a political solution must
precede a military settlement.
We must proceed to get with Thieu on proposals
- and unbending.
We will stop bombing under right conditions.
PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS: We have tried to come up with formula to
let us stop the bombing with no public
Vance:
They have refused to suggest anything at this point.
will not permit the Thieu-Ky
- of the promised land they blew it.
We have to give him time.
Secretary Rusk: Let's go back on 24-hour, 4 November basis.
The President:
Ben Read).
(Read note on conversation between Cy Vance and
Tell Kosygin the best laid plans of mice and men often come
- it was
passed.
I had an interesting conversation with Prime Minister Menzies over the
weekend. He said he did not see how we could win the war without more
public statements. He said there is a need to repeat statements over and
over. He thinks we should repeat
- .
They are not in the business of talking about negotiations at this stage.
It has been a one way conversation.
Bo does want contacts to continue . I do not think this is just be cause
of the ten mile radius around Hanoi.
T here is little d anger now that talk s w ill bre a k
- are definitively halted.
3. The Soviets, who we believe may have tried for peace on at least two
occasions in the past, are now silent and not offering the slightest encourage ment to us or to anyone else. Their conversations confirm our reading that
TOP 5ECRE1
- have a lot to show. We could say we have informed
them if they shell the cities and do rot respect the DMZ the deal is off.
We have told the Soviets that.
The conversation with Gromyko had this as part and parcel of the agreement.
understanding
- into a very harsh position. They were
pessimistic about the outcome. Norway thinks Hanoi is not interested in
conversation. They say that Hanoi believes it would have to offer concessions
so large as to persuade them that a better course is to wait
- not be on Kosygin's initiative. Averell talked to Zoran•.
It may be a response to that conversation. I agree with Dean that
the matter should be pursued. We should probe to see if we can get
assurances from the Soviets.
Also, we need private talks with North
- IN ITS PRESENT
OR MODIFIED FORM. ON ARRIVAL I WILL TRANSMIT TEXT.
...
~
... •· .
SE~D
.
" . .. 1'1. THE CONVERSATION ENDED WITH MY SAYING TO THE FOREIGN MIN
( ·: ";·, · TH f\ T I F PRES •J0 HNS0 N DE CI DE D T0 G0 F' 0 Hvi f\ HD WI TH
- APPREHENSIONS.
27. Q. HAD VIC! PRESIDENT KY AND TH£ OTHER OFFICIALS WHO
HAD PARTICIPATED GENERALLY ACCEPTED THE FORMULA?
28. BUNKER& VE DID NOT HAVE SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS. WE
HELD THEN JOINTLY WITH THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN
MINISTER.
29. Q. I