Oral history transcript, Samuel A. Adams, interview 1 (I), 9/20/1984, by Ted Gittinger

Adams' work for the CIA in Vietnam in 1965; identifying the enemy in Vietnam; self-defense and secret self-defense militiamen in Vietnam; Adams' involvement in Special National Intelligence Estimate 14.3-67: altered statistics reporting troop numbers and casualties in Vietnam; Joe Hovey's memo predicting the Tet offensive; LBJ's focus on Khe Sanh in December 1967 and January 1968; the Tet offensive; conflicting reports of enemy order of battle; a great increase in North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam; Viet Cong espionage and secret police; the testimony of defector Colonel Tran Van Dac; Don Oberdorfer's book, Tet!; the American public's loss of trust in the U.S. government; the authority of the people gathering order-of-battle data; difficulty investigating and interpreting information coming into Washington, D.C. from Vietnam; MACV information-gathering and delays in data reception; how infiltrators into South Vietnam were counted; the April 1972 offensive; information regarding falsified strength estimates from Commander James Meacham and Colonel Paul Weiler; Adams' view of how the government could have presented information to the public differently; Adams' treatment by the CIA for his unpopular positions; Adam's 1973 resignation from the CIA; George Crile and the Westmoreland v. CBS lawsuit.